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This study investigated the development of false memories for basic and superordinate names using the
DRM procedure. Two experiments were conducted with younger (35 years old) and older (1012 years
old) children. In the first experiment the DRM procedure was used with categorised lists and in the
second experiment both types of lists*categorised and associative*were applied. False recognition for
basic and superordinate names showed opposite developmental trends, regardless of list type. False
recognition increased for critical-basic items and decreased for critical-superordinate items with age.
These opposing results are mainly explained by age differences in conceptual knowledge and editing
processes.
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Research conducted in the last few decades has
shown that we can easily study false memories in
the laboratory and that it is possible to remember
information that was never experienced. The
DRM (after Deese, Roediger, and McDermott)
paradigm is one of the procedures that has most
contributed to this knowledge, showing very
consistent and robust results. This paradigm, first
created by Deese (1959) and later rediscovered
by Roediger and McDermott (1995), involves the
presentation of lists of words (e.g., bed, rest,
awake, and so forth) that are highly associated
with unpresented converging words (e.g., sleep).
In general, this procedure induces high levels
of false recall and false recognition of the
unpresented converging words (critical items),
sometimes at a rate that is similar to the recall
or recognition of the studied words.
Recently this paradigm has been applied to
children, with results showing that adults and
older children produce more false memories of
the unpresented critical items than younger
children (Anastasi & Rhodes, 2008; Brainerd,
Reyna, & Forrest, 2002; Brainerd, Reyna, Forrest,
& Karibian, 2006; Carneiro, Albuquerque,
Fernandez, & Esteves, 2007; Holliday & Weekes,
2006; Howe, 2005, 2006a; Howe, Cicchetti,
Toth, & Cerrito, 2004; Lampinen, Leding, Reed,
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& Odegard, 2006; Metzger et al., 2008; but see
also Ghetti, Qin, & Goodman, 2002, for contrast-
ing results). The same pattern of results has been
found even when the lists of words were created
by using associative norms for children rather
than for adults (Anastasi & Rhodes, 2008;
Carneiro et al., 2007; Metzger et al., 2008). This
finding was a surprising result since it is very well
known that younger children are, in general, more
suggestible than older children and adults (Bruck
& Ceci, 1999; Ceci, 1997; Ceci & Bruck, 1993;
Ceci, Bruck, & Battin, 2000).
Nevertheless, this kind of result can be very
well accommodated by the two most prominent
theories of false memories. The thematic consis-
tency framework predicts a developmental in-
crease in false memories when tested by this
paradigm because it is thought that the ability of
young children to connect the meaning of related
words is quite limited. For instance, the fuzzy-
trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998; Reyna &
Brainerd, 1995) assumes that memory representa-
tions involve two separate traces: a gist trace,
which captures the semantic and relational
information of the event, and a verbatim trace,
which extracts the specific information in its exact
surface form. This theory attributes to gist pro-
cessing the production of false memories and to
verbatim processing the function of suppressing
or rejecting false positives, with both types of
processing becoming more efficient throughout
development (Brainerd, Reyna, & Poole, 2000).
Since the ability to connect meaning across
multiple targets increases dramatically with age,
and at the same time it is difficult to take
advantage of parallel improvements in verbatim
memory because of so many meaning-sharing
studied targets, this theory predicts that the
magnitude of the DRM illusion should increase
with development. On the other hand, the activa-
tion-monitoring theory (Roediger, Balota, &
Watson, 2001; Roediger & McDermott, 1995)
could initially lead to the prediction that children
would show more false memories than adults
(Roediger, 1996; Roediger & McDermott, 2000),
because children, like older adults, are usually less
accurate in source monitoring; i.e., more prone to
confuse different sources of the same phenom-
enon (Foley, Johnson, & Raye, 1983). However,
in order to account for the general pattern of a
developmental increase of false memories ob-
tained with the DRM paradigm, some researchers
have more recently advanced an alternative
explanation, still in line with the activation
framework (Gallo, 2006; Howe, 2006a; Howe,
Gagnon, & Thouas, 2008). Essentially, the argu-
ment is that this developmental pattern in false
memories could also be explained if one assumes
the existence of more elaborate associative and
conceptual networks with age, which in turn could
lead to a higher activation of the converging
words. Howe (2006a) has further suggested that
this developmental trend in false memories is not
only due to the growth in the knowledge base
itself, but could also be explained by an increased
automaticity in the activation and accessibility of
those concepts and associations in the children’s
knowledge base.
The DRM procedure has also been used to
study false memory for categorical information
in adults (e.g., Dewhurst, 2001; Seamon, Luo,
Schlegel, Greene, & Goldenberg, 2000, Exp. 2;
Smith, Ward, Tindell, Sifonis, & Wilkenfeld, 2000)
and to a lesser extent in children (Brainerd &
Reyna, 2007; Chiang & Chiu, 2006; Howe, 2006a;
Seamon et al., 2000, Exp. 1). In this case the lists
are composed of basic exemplars of categories,
presented in a decreasing order of frequency,
as dictated by category norms (e.g., Battig &
Montague, 1969). Usually the dominant exemplar
of the category is omitted from the study list,
serving as a critical item for recall or recognition
tests. For example, for the category list composed
of cat, lion, giraffe, elephant, and so on, the critical
item would be dog. Research using categorised
lists has demonstrated that this methodology,
similar to the original DRM paradigm, is an
efficient tool for evoking false memories for the
most dominant exemplars of categories.
Some of these studies (e.g., Buchanan, Brown,
Cabeza, & Maitson, 1999; Park, Shobe, &
Kihlstrom, 2005) were concerned with which
type of lists*associative or categorised*produce
more false memories, discovering that associative
lists produced higher levels of false recognition
in adults, a finding also supported by Pierce,
Gallo, Weiss, and Schacter (2005) and by Smith,
Gerkens, Pierce, and Choi (2002). However, the
associative advantage in producing false mem-
ories has not been replicated in children. Howe
(2006a) showed that associative lists did not differ
from categorised lists in producing false recall in
children of 5, 7, and 11 years of age. His results
showed the expected increase in false recall with
age, but this happened regardless of the type of
list, indicating that the developmental pattern
of false memories for categorised lists is similar to
the one observed with the standard application of
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the DRM paradigm. The same developmental
pattern for categorised verbal lists was also found
by Brainerd and Reyna (2007). Only when the
exemplars were presented pictorially did devel-
opmental trends in false recall disappear, support-
ing the results of other studies that also used
pictures of exemplars (Howe, 2006a; Seamon
et al., 2000) or pictures of associates (Ghetti
et al., 2002).
The general developmental pattern of false
memories obtained with both associative and
categorical lists is usually explained relying only
on what happens in the encoding phase, regard-
less of the underlying theory (fuzzy trace or the
more recent version of activation monitoring). In
the present study we are also concerned about
what happens, in terms of age differences, in the
retrieval phase of the false memory phenomenon.
Fuzzy-trace theory posits that one specific editing
operation, recollection rejection, could suppress
false memories of events that did not occur but
that are gist-consistent with events that did occur.
It is assumed that recollection rejection neutra-
lises the familiarity of false-but-gist-consistent
events through the retrieval of true verbatim
traces, and that this editing mechanism develops
with age (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002; Brainerd,
Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin, 2003). On the other
hand the activation-monitoring theory, relying on
Johnson’s concept of source monitoring (Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye,
1981), assumes that, in order to reject a false
memory, one should correctly distinguish the
memory sources of the presented and critical
items, and attribute the origin of a false memory
to an internal generation process rather than to
an actual, external world event. According to
previous research (Foley & Johnson, 1985; Foley
et al., 1983), young children are more likely than
adults to confuse memories from different
sources, and therefore it is expected that younger
children would find it harder to edit out or
suppress false memories via monitoring processes.
Gallo (2006) suggested that the underdeve-
loped monitoring processes of younger children
could account for the general observed finding
that unrelated false memories are more frequent
in younger than in older children: Once the
representation of an unpresented item is some-
how formed or activated, younger children would
be less likely to edit out or suppress its false
memory. Following this line of reasoning, it could
further be predicted that, under some conditions,
younger children could also show more false
memories for related or thematic lures than older
children. This could happen if the editing process
is complicated for younger children because of
their lack of appropriate rules for editing out. In
more concrete terms, we would like to argue that
if the critical and the studied words are from
different levels of the categorical hierarchy, false
memories should be reduced in a population that
could easily distinguish between words of the
same category but from different hierarchical
levels. However, this would be harder for a
population that cannot make use of such knowl-
edge. This argument is based on two types of
findings.
The first one is concerned with the relationship
between the editing process and distinctiveness.
The editing process is usually helped by distinc-
tive information, being more efficient when the
unpresented information is in some way distinc-
tive from the studied information. Distinctiveness
can help to avoid memory errors (Schacter &
Wiseman, 2006). Schacter, Israel, and Racine
(1999) introduced the concept of heuristic distinc-
tiveness to show that participants could engage in
a mental operation capable of suppressing false
memories based on the recollection of distinctive
details. These authors argued that false memories
arise when participants are not able to either
encode or retain distinctive details of individual
items. The encoding of distinctive information,
facilitated by presenting pictures as study mate-
rial, reduces false memories regardless of age
(Ghetti et al., 2002; Israel & Schacter, 1997).
The concept of distinctiveness could explain
why some characteristics of the critical lures,
when contrasted with the studied words, affect
false memories. For example, the length of the
critical item was found to be a predictor of false
recognition when compared to the length of the
studied words (Madigan & Neuse, 2004). Indivi-
duals could easily engage in a thought of the type
‘‘I remembered that all the words in the list were
short, so a long word might not have been
presented’’. Moreover, emotional critical lures
lead to a reduction in false recognition when the
studied lists are only composed of neutral words
(Pesta, Murphy, & Sanders, 2001). In the case of
the present research, the hierarchical distinctive-
ness would make it easier to reject the distractors
from a different category level. Participants could
use a criterion of this type: ‘‘I remember that all
the items were basic exemplars, thus a super-
ordinate name could have not been in the list’’.
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The second type of evidence that supports our
argument is related to age differences in terms of
categorical knowledge. The studies about con-
ceptual development indicate that older children
and adults already have a hierarchical structure
of their categorical knowledge and that they
regularly use this knowledge in memory tasks
for a subsequent better retrieval of information
(Bjorklund & Marchena, 1984). In contrast, it is
thought that preschool children do not have an
actual understanding of hierarchies (Nelson,
1996). Lucariello, Kyratzis and Nelson (1992),
working on a variety of tasks, showed that the
taxonomic knowledge of preschoolers is re-
stricted to slot-filler categories (i.e., based on a
shared event) and that vertical taxonomic knowl-
edge emerges later (as this perspective is not
totally consensual: see also other authors, such as
Waxman & Namy, 1997).
Young children can easily perform identifica-
tion tasks in which they categorise objects at both
the basic and the superordinate level, but they
cannot succeed in class inclusion tasks at this age.
To account for the disparate results obtained in
the study of categorical hierarchies with different
tasks, another perspective (Blewitt, 1993, 1994)
proposed that the understanding of hierarchies is
constructed gradually, moving from an implicit to
a more explicit knowledge. According to this
perspective, preschool children can form super-
ordinate categories, but they cannot draw infer-
ences from hierarchies. Despite different
theoretical views, it seems consensual that a
hierarchical taxonomic organisation becomes an
increasingly dominant mode of classification as
children develop (Bjorklund, 2005). Thus for a
population that lacks this specific knowledge, as
in the case of preschoolers, the suppression of
words belonging to a different hierarchical level
should be harder or even impossible.
In order to analyse whether children’s con-
ceptual knowledge could influence false memory
editing, two experiments were designed in which
the DRM procedure was applied to categorised
lists, aiming to analyse the developmental pattern
of false memories for words differing in their
levels of categorical hierarchy. False memories
will be analysed for words that belong to the same
hierarchical level as the studied words (basic) and
for words that belong to a different level (super-
ordinate), in two distinct age-groups of children
who are presumed to differ in their understanding
about the organisation of conceptual knowledge.
It is expected that older children will be able to
easily edit their false memories for superordinate
names, because their knowledge of conceptual
hierarchies will increase the distinctiveness of
superordinate distractors. In contrast, younger
children will be unable to edit those false
memories because, besides their usual difficulties
in this domain, they lack the conceptual knowl-
edge that would help them in the editing process.
Regarding false memories for the basic unpre-
sented exemplars, it is expected that the develop-
mental trend will be the same as the one found for
the standard DRM paradigm. This means that
older children will be more prone to falsely
remember the unpresented basic exemplars than
younger children. Both fuzzy-trace theory and the
more recent versions of the activation-monitoring
framework would predict these results. Both are
dual process theories1 and integrate error-inflat-
ing processes (activation or gist) and error-editing
processes (monitoring or recollection rejection)
(Arndt & Gould, 2006). Besides this, both
approaches assume that these processes increase
with age. Specifically, the improvements in false
memory editing are facilitated by developmental
progresses either in source monitoring abilities
(Foley & Johnson, 1985; Foley et al., 1983) or in
verbatim memory ability (Brainerd & Reyna,
2002; Brainerd et al., 2003). Thus, both of them
would predict that, in general, preadolescents will
be more proficient in rejecting false memories
than preschoolers. However, in order to provide
adequate accounts for the expected results,
both theories would need to incorporate the
role of distinctiveness afforded by the conceptual
knowledge.
EXPERIMENT 1
Two recent studies, one with adults (Park et al.,
2005) and the other with older children (Chiang
& Chiu, 2006), showed that when the critical lure
is from another level of categorisation of the list
items, false memories are rarely produced. Adults
and older children (around 10 years old) usually
do not falsely recognise names of categories
1 It is important to note that our own view differs from the
associative activation theory (AAT) by Howe (2005, 2006a) in
the sense that his theory is not considered a dual-process
theory. More in accordance with Gallo (2006), we argue
associative activation and also monitoring abilities increase
throughout development (this argument will be developed in
the General Discussion).
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(superordinate level) that are labels of the pre-
sented lists of exemplars (basic level) (Chiang &
Chiu, 2006; Park et al., 2005), because those
words are from distinct levels of the categorical
hierarchy. In our view the distinctiveness of
critical words, as a result of their distinct position
in the hierarchical level, makes them relatively
easy to suppress.
The present experiment addresses this specific
question by applying the DRM procedure to
categorised lists, testing for both types of critical
words*the dominant exemplar (basic level) and
the name of the category (superordinate level)*
in younger (mainly preschoolers) and older chil-
dren (mainly preadolescents). Specifically, it is
predicted that false memories for the dominant
exemplar will be higher for older than for
younger children, while for the name of the
category it is expected that younger children
will produce more false memories than older
children. The studies by Brainerd, Reyna, and
Kneer (1995) and Brainerd and Reyna (1996)
support this prediction. Also using categorical
material, but a different procedure from the
DRM paradigm, these studies showed that
5-year-olds falsely recognised more categorised
related words (including category names) than
8-year-olds.
As far as we know, only two other manipula-
tions have demonstrated reverse directions of
developmental trends in false memories. Brainerd
and Reyna (2007) showed that false memories for
a category exemplar increased with age when
several exemplars of that category were studied,
but decreased when only one exemplar was
studied. Dewhurst and Robinson (2004) and
Holliday and Weekes (2006) found that false
memories increase with age for associative lists
but decrease for phonological lists.
Methods
Participants. A total of 72 children of two age-
groups participated in this experiment. The
younger group included 36 children from 3 to
5 years of age (17 male, 19 female), with a mean
age of 4 years and 3 months; and the older group
was composed of 36 children from 10 to 12 years
of age (23 male, 13 female), with a mean age of
11 years and 8 months. All the participants were
Caucasian and native speakers of Portuguese,
recruited from kindergartens and elementary
schools in Lisbon, Portugal.
Material. Six different categories were selected
from the study of Portuguese category norms for
children (Carneiro, Albuquerque, & Fernandez,
2008): Fruits, Animals, Parts of the Human Body,
Articles of Clothing, Articles of Furniture, and
Vehicles. The 11 most frequent exemplars of each
category for preschoolers and for preadolescents
were used in this study. The presented lists were
formed by the 10 most frequent exemplars
(omitting the first exemplar), placed in decreasing
order of frequency according to the previously
collected norms (Carneiro et al., 2008). The mate-
rial was specific to each age group*exemplars in
the list and their order*and therefore not
identical for both ages, since previous studies
suggested that children can achieve higher
levels in standard memory tasks (Bjorklund &
Thompson, 1983) and in false memory tasks
(Carneiro et al., 2007) when the material is
specific to their age. Two types of critical words
were considered for each list: the name of the
category or critical-superordinate (e.g., vehicle)
and the first exemplar of each category or critical-
basic (e.g., car). Because the category norms for a
Portuguese-speaking population showed that the
first exemplar in different ages is not the same for
all categories, three of the critical-basic items
were different in the two age groups. For the
category Fruits the critical-basic item for pre-
schoolers was apple, while it was orange for
preadolescents; for the category Parts of the
Human Body it was belly for preschoolers and
legs for preadolescents; and for the category
Animals it was lion for preschoolers and dog for
preadolescents. The remaining three categories*
Articles of Clothing, Articles of Furniture, and
Vehicles*had the same critical-basic items*trou-
sers, table, and car*for both ages (see Appendix).
Each participant listened to four out of six lists,
with the remaining two lists being used for the
recognition task. For each age group, three
different groups of participants were formed to
ensure that all the lists were counterbalanced
between presented and distractor lists.
The recognition test included 24 words: 8
studied words corresponding to the first and
fifth positions of each presented list; 4 critical-
superordinate words of the presented lists; 4
critical-basic words of the presented lists; 4 words
from the first and fifth positions of the two
unpresented lists; 2 critical-superordinate words
of the unpresented lists; and 2 critical-basic words
of the unpresented lists. For the critical-super-
ordinate items, the names were simplified to just
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one word in the singular form (fruit, animal, body,
clothing, furniture, and vehicle).
Procedure. All the participants were tested
individually. Half the participants of each age
group performed the recall task after the pre-
sentation of each list, whereas the other half did a
distractor task after listening to each list. This
procedure was adopted because it is known from
studies of adults (e.g., Roediger & McDermott,
1995; Roediger, McDermott, Pisoni, & Gallo,
2004) as well as from studies of children
(Brainerd et al., 2006) that false recognition is en-
hanced through the performance of a prior recall
task of the same material. In both conditions the
participants performed a recognition task at the
end. In this way it would be possible to analyse
whether false recognition is affected by age
differences for both the dominant exemplar and
the category name, regardless of the recall task.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of
the two conditions. In the recall condition the
participants were first instructed to listen to the
words presented on the tape recorder (at a rate of
2 seconds per word) and were then encouraged to
recall the presented words (during 1½ minutes).
In the distractor condition the participants were
advised to listen to the same words presented on
the tape recorder for a subsequent memory test.
Older children were required to count backwards
(from 50 to 0) after the presentation of each list;
and younger children, because of their difficulties
in performing this task, were required to count
forwards (from 0 to 20). Although the procedure
was different, both age groups had the same time
to perform it (1½ minutes for each list, corre-
sponding to the duration of the recall task). To
follow this fixed time it was sometimes necessary
to give an additional instruction to either con-
tinue or to stop counting. In both conditions the
experimenter did not make any reference to the
categorical relation between the items. The task
was presented as a memory game and the
instructions were adapted to the participants’ age.
The recognition task was administered after
the recall or the distractor task of the last list
in a self-paced manner. The participants were
instructed to listen to the words read by the
experimenter and for each word they answered
‘‘yes’’ if they believed the word had been pre-
sented on the tape recorder or ‘‘no’’ if they
thought the word had not been presented. To
control for order effects, the items of the recogni-
tion test were presented in a random order, which
was different for each participant. Overall, each
experimental session lasted between 15 and
25 minutes.
Results and discussion
Recall. Correct recall was measured by the
proportions of studied words, dividing the total
number of correctly recalled words by the num-
ber of studied lists and the number of items
presented in each list. The false recall was
separated in proportions of critical-basic words
and in proportions of critical-superordinate
words, calculated respectively by dividing the
number of critical-basic words and critical-super-
ordinate words falsely recalled by the number of
studied lists. The proportion of intrusions was
obtained in relation to the number of studied lists
and the total number of words recalled for each
list. The presented data were collapsed across
gender because preliminary analyses showed no
significant effects.
Because the false recall of critical-superordi-
nate words was almost non-existent for both age
groups (only one young child recalled a super-
ordinate word for one list), the analysis of this type
of recall was not taken into consideration
in the general analysis of the recall task (see
Table 1). The type of recall was then divided into
correct recall (studied items), false recall (critical-
basic items), and intrusions. A 2 (Age Group: 35
vs 10-12)3 (Type of Recall: correct vs false vs
intrusions) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
repeated measures over type of recall was per-
formed. The analysis revealed two main effects,
one of age, F(1, 34)28.47, MSE .03, pB.001,
hp2.46, and the other of type of recall, F(2, 68)
56.30, MSE.03, pB.001, hp2.62. Overall, older
children recalled more items than younger chil-
dren. In addition, for the total sample correct recall
(.49) was significantly higher than false recall (.26)
and intrusions (.08), and false recall was signifi-
cantly higher than intrusions (all the differences,
obtained by pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni
test), were significant for p5.001). However, the
significant AgeType of Recall interaction, F(2,
68)20.36, MSE.03, pB.001, hp2.37, clarified
that correct and false recall were higher for older
children than for younger children, but the reverse
pattern occurred in the case of intrusions. Younger
children recalled more intrusions than older chil-
dren (.13 vs .03). This pattern of results with
categorical material seems to be in accordance
with the developmental pattern observed with
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associative material. As had previously been the
case for DRM associative lists in other studies (for
a review of these studies, see Brainerd, Reyna, &
Ceci, 2008) older children, using categorised lists,
also recalled more studied exemplars and false
critical-basic items, but made less intrusions than
younger children.
In order to distinguish the developmental
pattern of intrusions for gist-related and gist-
unrelated words, the intrusions were divided into
related (other exemplars of the category, exclud-
ing the dominant exemplar and the category
name) and unrelated intrusions (all the other
words not considered exemplars of the category,
excluding also the dominant exemplar and the
category name). The analyses showed that pre-
schoolers gave more unrelated intrusions than
preadolescents (respectively M.31 vs M.01),
t(34)2.44, pB.05, but no significant difference
was found for related intrusions (M.19 vs M
.21), t(34).15, p.05. The same results were
found when the related and unrelated intrusions
were divided by the total number of words
recalled*for unrelated intrusions: M.09 vs
M.002, t(34)2.69, pB.05; for related intru-
sions: M.05 vs M.03, t(34)1.42, p.05. In
line with the findings of other studies (Brainerd
et al., 2002; Carneiro et al., 2007), it seems
unquestionable that unrelated intrusions decrease
with age. For related intrusions we did not find
any age differences with categorised lists,
although the same type of analyses revealed a
decrease of related intrusions for associative lists
in other studies (Carneiro et al., 2007). The
dissociation between age differences for cate-
gorised and associative lists could be related to
an increase of knowledge about the number of
exemplars that belong to each category. Age
differences in related intrusions could be lower
when older children know more exemplars of that
specific category, which could result in a higher
generation of gist-related intrusions. A more
elaborate discussion of the related and unrelated
intrusions will be included in the general discus-
sion.
Recognition. A preliminary analysis of the
recognition of distractors between the different
ages revealed that younger and older children
differed in terms of their overall response bias,
t(70)3.28, pB.01. Younger children recognised
more distractor items than older children (.37 vs
.14), which justifies the use of the signal detection
theory for comparisons between those two age
groups. Thus, recognition data were corrected by
A? values, a signal detection nonparametric mea-
sure similar to d’ measure that, in this case, gives
us information about the ability to discriminate
between targets and distractors or criticals and
distractors. The method by which signal detection
TABLE 1
Proportions of different types of responses in the recall and recognition tasks of Experiment 1
Younger children Older children
M SD M SD
Recall
Studied .30 .15 .68 .10
Critical .13 .15 .39 .31
Intrusions .13 .14 .03 .04
Recognition
Studied
With recall .78 (.73) .18 (.16) .86 (.92) .10 (.03)
Without recall .86 (.83) .12 (.12) .71 (.77) .21 (.15)
Critical-basic
With recall .65 (.68) .27 (.14) .64 (.78) .32 (.13)
Without recall .61 (.66) .32 (.14) .60 (.66) .30 (.15)
Critical-superordinate
With recall .64 (.66) .29 (.16) .10 (.55) .21 (.11)
Without recall .60 (.69) .21 (.15) .46 (.62) .36 (.17)
Distractors
With recall .43 .38 .01 .03
Without recall .31 .35 .26 .25
Data in parentheses are related to A’ values
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measures were computed followed the same
procedure used by other authors (see, for exam-
ple, Odegard, Holliday, Brainerd, & Reyna, 2008,
for a more detailed explanation).
Correct and false recognition were analysed
separately. Correct recognition was analysed
by a 2 (Age Group: 35 vs 1012)2 (Condition:
previous recall vs previous distractor task)
between-participants ANOVA. A main effect of
age revealed that, in general, older children
recognised correctly more items than younger
children (.85 vs .78 A? values), F(1, 68)3.96,
MSE.02, pB.05, hp2.06. However, a signifi-
cant AgeCondition interaction, F(1, 68)
17.46, MSE.02, pB.001, hp2.20, showed that
older children recognised more correct items
when a recall task had been presented previously,
whereas younger children had a better perfor-
mance when the recall task had not been pre-
viously administered. This seems to be a striking
result since it shows that older children behave
more like adults, revealing the same advantage in
correct recognition when a recall task is pre-
viously administered. Younger children did not
benefit from the previous recall and, contrary to
what was expected, this task seemed to disrupt
the performance in the recognition task. One
plausible explanation to account for the different
effect of the recall task in distinct age groups
could be related to the amount and quality of the
items recalled. As younger children usually
recall few items and some of these are intru-
sions, this could increase interference rather
than serve as a rehearsal of the studied items.
It is possible that the high percentage of
intrusions in relation to the items recalled over-
all could decrease correct recognition in the
younger children.
False recognition was analysed by a 2 (Age
Group: 35 vs 1012)2 (Condition: previous
recall vs previous distractor task)2 (Critical
Item: basic vs superordinate) ANOVA, with
repeated measures over type of critical item.
This analysis showed a main effect of type of
critical item, F(1, 68)8.01, MSE.02, pB.01,
hp2.11, with, in general, the critical-basic words
producing higher levels of false recognition than
critical-superordinate words (.70 vs .63 A? values).
In addition, two significant interactions were also
found. The significant AgeCritical Item inter-
action, F(1, 68)9.70, MSE.02, pB.01, hp2
.13, revealed that, compared to younger children,
older children produced higher levels of false
recognition for the critical-basic words, whereas
younger children showed higher levels of false
recognition for the critical-superordinate words
than did older children. This opposite develop-
mental trend observed for critical-basic and
critical-superordinate items was already predicted
on theoretical grounds. Although older children
produce more false recognition for the critical-
basic items, they are also more prone to suppress
the recognition of items that are from a distinct
hierarchical level of the studied items. Probably
because they are more able to distinguish basic
and superordinate names, they could also more
easily reject false recognition of unpresented
superordinate names. As can be seen in Table 1,
older children gave more false recognitions for
critical-basic than for critical-superordinate items
(.72 vs .59 A? values), whereas for younger
children the means of false recognition for both
types of critical items were similar (.67 vs .68 A?
values). This comparison between false recogni-
tion of those types of critical items according to
the age group seemed to reveal an evolution in
conceptual knowledge and editing processes.
Because younger children have some limitations
in editing and are not helped by the categorical
knowledge that makes superordinate names dis-
tinctive, they cannot suppress false memories for
those items. As a result, they falsely recognised
the same amount of critical-basic and critical-
superordinate items.
The other significant interaction between Cri-
tical Item and Condition, F(1, 68)7.45, MSE
.02, pB.01, hp2.10, indicates that, overall, the
administration of the recall task before the
recognition task enhances false recognition of
critical-basic items, but decreases false recogni-
tion of critical-superordinate words. The finding
that the recall task increases false memory in a
subsequent recognition task was already known
for adults tested with DRM associative lists (e.g.,
Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Roediger et al.,
2004). In this experiment the same effect was also
found for the dominant unpresented exemplars
of categorised lists with a population of children.
On the one hand, the recall of list exemplars
produced a higher false recognition of the
unpresented dominant exemplars of those cate-
gories. On the other hand, the recall task stressed
the fact that the names of the categories (critical-
superordinate items) were not presented. This last
finding was mainly true for older children,
probably because they are more able to distin-
guish basic from superordinate names.
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In general, the results of Experiment 1 con-
firmed our prediction of distinct developmental
trends for basic and superordinate critical items.
Moreover, the application of the DRM procedure
to categorised lists showed the same general
pattern of age differences as the one already
found with the associative lists.
EXPERIMENT 2
In the first experiment we found that younger
children showed more false recognition for the
names of the categories than did older children.
But is this effect specific to categorised lists, in
which the exemplars presented also primed the
names of their categories, or is it a more general
effect that also happens in associative lists? It
seems that, when categorised lists are presented,
older children can use their conceptual knowl-
edge to suppress the words that belong to a
different level from the studied words. During
this task these children probably noticed that the
words presented were all exemplars of a basic
level of a certain category (e.g., ‘‘all words were
exemplars of the category animals’’) and there-
fore could easily suppress a word (e.g., ‘‘animal’’)
that, although related to the category, did not
belong to the same hierarchical level. Alterna-
tively, preschoolers might have noticed that all
words were related to the same subject, and
therefore activated the gist of the list (e.g.
‘‘animal’’) but could not later suppress it because
they did not make a distinction between the basic
and superordinate levels.
With associative lists participants cannot rely
on this type of strategy to suppress the category
names, because the lists are not composed of
exemplars. We predict that associative lists would
decrease the distinctiveness of superordinate
names, reducing the probability of those words
being rejected. To address this question, cate-
gorised and associative lists, sharing the same
critical-basic words, were presented to younger
and older children to further test the false
recognition of those critical-basic words and their
corresponding superordinate words. First, this
experiment aims to replicate the effect of an
opposite developmental trend for basic and
superordinate names with categorised lists, and
second, it analyses whether this effect could also
be extended to associative lists.
This second experiment also makes it possible
to compare associative and categorised lists in the
production of false memories for basic exemplars
in children. The only study that analysed the type
of list effect in children’s false memories used a
recall task (Howe, 2006a), showing similar levels
of false recall for associative and categorised lists.
The present study also aims to clarify whether it is
possible to extend the same results to a recogni-
tion task, predicting no differences in false
recognition between associative and categorised
lists.
Method
Participants. A total of 56 children participated
in this experiment: 28 children from 3 to 5 years
of age (11 male, 17 female), with a mean age of
4 years and 8 months, and 28 children from 10 to
12 years of age (11 male, 17 female), with a mean
age of 11 years and 9 months. As in Experiment 1,
all the participants were Caucasian and native
speakers of Portuguese, and were tested in
kindergartens and elementary schools in Lisbon.
None of these participants took part in Experi-
ment 1 or participated in the normative free
association task used to construct the associative
material. For the normative study, another
60 participants (30 for each age group) were
recruited.
Material. The same six categories selected for
Experiment 1 were also used in this experiment as
presented lists. The lists were of two types:
categorised, and composed of the 10 exemplars
of each category, excluding the first element (as in
Experiment 1); and associative, and composed of
the associates of the dominant exemplars of those
categories. Thus, associative and categorised lists
shared the same critical-basic items.
In order to construct the Portuguese associa-
tive lists for the two age groups a preliminary
normative study was conducted. Participants of
both ages performed a free association task in
which they were asked, for each word, to provide
the first three other words that came to their
minds. They were instructed to always associate
from the target word and not from the first or
second associates to minimise response chaining,
which could generate associates not directly
related with the target word (Nelson, McEvoy,
& Dennis, 2000). The target words included the
dominant exemplars of five of the selected
categories: apple, lion, belly, trousers, and table
for younger children and orange, dog, legs,
trousers, and table for older children. The target
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word car was not included because it was
already normed in another free association study
(Carneiro, Albuquerque, Fernandez, & Esteves,
2004), and associative lists for both ages were
already available for this word. The associates
provided for each word were all listed in decreas-
ing order of frequency, and the 10 associates with
the highest frequencies were selected to form the
associative lists for each age group.
In the memory task each participant listened to
six lists: three associative and three categorised.
The words from the six presented lists were all
different. The lists that served as categorised and
associative lists were counterbalanced across
participants. Moreover, to control for order
effects, half the participants listened first to the
associative lists and then to the categorised lists,
while the other half listened first to the cate-
gorised lists and then to the associative ones.
Two types of recognition tests were created for
each age group: one for the associative lists and
the other for the categorised lists. Each of these
recognition tests was composed of 16 words: 6
words from 3 presented lists (the first and the
eighth word of each list), 3 critical-basic words, 3
critical-superordinate words, and 4 unrelated
words from one unpresented list.
Procedure. Participants were randomly distrib-
uted into four different conditions to control for
list and order effects: Group 1 listened first to
three associative lists and then to another three
categorised lists; Group 2 listened first to the
same categorised lists as Group 1 and then to the
same associative lists as Group 1; Group 3
listened first to another three associative lists
(corresponding to the critical words of the cate-
gorised lists of group 1 and 2) and then to other
categorised lists (corresponding to the critical
words of the associative lists of group 1 and 2);
and Group 4 listened first to the same categorised
lists as Group 3 and then to the same associative
lists as Group 3. All the participants were tested
individually.
The participants were initially instructed to
listen to the lists of words presented on a tape
recorder, at a rate of one word every 2 seconds,
for subsequent memory tests. Participants lis-
tened to the first three lists (associative or
categorised, depending on the group condition),
and immediately afterwards they performed the
first recognition test relating to those lists (asso-
ciative or categorised, according to the nature of
the presented lists). They subsequently listened to
the other three lists, followed by the second
corresponding recognition test.
The general instructions for the recognition
task were similar to those given in Experiment 1.
For each recognition test the participants were
also advised to think only about the last three lists
presented in order to decide whether the specific
word had already been presented or not. As in
Experiment 1, the words of the recognition tests
were presented in a random order, which was
different for each participant. Each experimental
session lasted around 1520 minutes.
Results and discussion
The mean proportions of studied, critical-basic,
critical-superordinate items, and distractors sepa-
rated by list type and age group are presented in
Table 2. Once again, because older children
produced fewer false alarms than younger chil-
dren, t(70)2.56, pB.05, data were corrected by
the signal detection theory, providing A? values
that are also displayed in parentheses in Table 2.
Correct recognition was analysed by a 2 (Age
Group: 35 vs 1012)2 (Type of List: associative
vs categorised) ANOVA with repeated measures
over type of list for the targets A? values. As
expected, a main effect of age group, F(1, 54)
11.90, MSE.006, pB.01, hp2.18, revealed that
the older group recognised a higher level of
correct items than the younger group (.91 vs .86
A? values). There was also a significant AgeList
interaction, F(1, 54)5.75, MSE.005, pB.05,
hp2.10, which indicated an opposite advantage of
type of list for each age group. The categorised
lists lead to an improved correct recognition for
the older group, which is consistent with the
results usually observed in studies of adults
(Buchanan et al., 1999; Pierce et al., 2005). In
contrast, the younger group recognised more
correct items in the associative lists. Although
this last result did not match with the findings of
Howe (2006a) regarding a better recall of cate-
gorised lists for children of 5, 7, and 11 years of
age, it could reflect a preference of younger
children for associative relations rather than
categorical relations. It is well known that pre-
school children rely more on associative relations
in a wide range of cognitive tasks. For example,
picture-sorting tasks have shown that preschool
children prefer to organise the figures by associa-
tive relations (e.g., beehoney) than by categorical
relations (e.g., beebutterfly) (e.g., Smiley &
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Brown, 1979). Also, for those children clustering
in free recall tasks is mainly dominated by
associative criteria, even in situations where
categorical criteria would be a better strategy
(Bjorklund & Marchena, 1984).
False recognition was first analysed by a 2
(Age Group: 35 vs. 1012)2 (Type of List:
associative vs categorised)2 (Critical Item:
basic vs superordinate) ANOVA, with repeated
measures over type of list and critical item on
each participant’s A? values. The analysis revealed
a main effect of critical item, F(1, 54)76.28,
MSE.012, pB.001, hp2.59, with the critical-
basic items producing a higher level of false
recognition than the critical-superordinate items
(.79 vs .66 A? values). Also, a significant Age
Critical Item interaction was found, F(1, 54)
29.52, MSE.012, pB.001, hp2.35,, revealing
that older children produced more false recogni-
tion for the critical-basic items than younger
children (.84 vs .74 A? values), whereas youn-
ger children falsely recognised more critical-
superordinate items than older children (.69 vs
.63 A? values). This significant interaction was in
line with the results of Experiment 1, and it
reinforces the idea that there are different devel-
opmental trends for critical-basic and critical-
superordinate unpresented items, regardless of
the type of list. Even for the associative lists, the
superordinate names were more likely to be
falsely recognised by the younger children than
by the older ones. Separated analysis for the
critical-basic and for the critical-superordinate
items (2 age2 type of list ANOVA) confirmed
that the difference between the younger group
and the older one was significant for both types of
critical items*for critical-basic items, F(1, 54)
13.64, MSE.019, pB.01, hp2.20,; for critical-
superordinate items, F(1, 54)5.15, MSE.023,
pB.05, hp2.09. Moreover, the 2 (age)2 (type
of list) analysis of variance for the critical-basic
items showed a marginal AgeType of List
interaction, F(1, 54)3.80, MSE.014, p.06,
hp2.07, which suggests that younger children
could be more likely to recognise the critical-
basic items for the associative lists than for the
categorised lists. Once again, although only a
tendency, this result could suggest that, because of
their preference for associative relations, it is
easier for younger children to extract the asso-
ciative gist than the categorical-dominant exem-
plar. For the older group, the false recognition
proportions of critical-basic items were similar for
both types of list, which is consistent with the
false recall results of the study of Howe (2006a).
The same type of analysis for the critical-super-
ordinate items did not reveal a significant inter-
action. No other significant effects emerged.
Overall, this experiment replicated the effect
of opposite developmental trends for false recog-
nition of basic and superordinate names with
categorical lists, and extended it to associative
lists. Besides this, the results showed no signifi-
cant differences in false recognition for basic
names between associative and categorised lists
for older children, in line with the false recall
results of Howe (2006a). However, preschoolers
showed higher true and false recognition for
TABLE 2
Proportions of different types of responses in the recognition task of Experiment 2
Younger children Older children
M SD M SD
Studied
Associative .80 (.88) .18 (.05) .84 (.89) .17 (.07)
Categorical .74 (.84) .21 (.12) .88 (.92) .12 (.03)
Critical-basic
Associative .55 (.77) .31 (.12) .69 (.83) .29 (.13)
Categorical .44 (.70) .39 (.17) .67 (.84) .27 (.09)
Critical-superordinate
Associative .43 (.70) .36 (.19) .21 (.64) .24 (.15)
Categorical .36 (.68) .29 (.15) .12 (.61) .24 (.11)
Distractors
Associative .07 .12 .04 .14
Categorical .10 .16 .01 .05
Data in parentheses are related to A’ values
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associative than for categorised lists, probably
reflecting a preference for associative rather than
categorical relations. Although those results were
not totally in accordance with the results of Howe
(2006a), they also contradicted the assumption
that the DRM illusion in children is driven by
thematic rather than associative information.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Both experiments analysed whether names from
different levels in the categorical hierarchy pro-
duce similar or opposite developmental trends for
false memories. These experiments showed that
when lists of basic exemplars were presented
for study, opposite developmental trends were
observed for the unpresented basic dominant
exemplar and for the unpresented superordinate
category name. There is an increase of false
recognition for critical-basic items and a decrease
of false recognition for critical-superordinate
items with age (an increase of false recall for
critical-basic items was also obtained in Experi-
ment 1).
As in the interpretation of the developmental
trend for the DRM associative lists, in categorised
lists the critical-basic items seem to be more
easily activated by older children because of an
enriched conceptual knowledge and/or greater
ease in connecting the gist. The enhanced
strength of links between the exemplars of the
categories and the better definition of the domi-
nant exemplar in the category with age could
account for the critical-basic developmental
trend. But the increasing ability in gist processing
by older children could also lead to a better
extraction of the mental representation of the
category, which in turn could strongly activate its
dominant exemplar. As occurred in the DRM
associative lists, the explanations of age differ-
ences in false memories for DRM categorical lists
using the critical-basic items are based on what
happens in the encoding phase.
However, the opposite developmental trend
observed for critical-superordinate items can be
explained by taking into account differences in
the editing processes between the two age groups.
As far as monitoring abilities are concerned,
younger children are in general more likely than
adults to confuse memories from different
sources. It is well documented that preschool
children can use some forms of monitoring, but
they are particularly inefficient when the origins
of memory are rather similar (Lindsay, Johnson,
& Kwon, 1991), as when they have to discriminate
which actor has performed a given action or when
they have to distinguish between performed
actions and imagined actions (Roberts, 2000). It
seems that their lower quality of encoding, and
the fact that they do not realise the connection
between knowledge and source is important for
making accurate attributions, are possible causes
of their source confusions (Perner, 2000; Roberts,
2000). Other authors (e.g., Schacter, Kagan, &
Leichtman, 1995) attribute the cause of young
children’s source-monitoring difficulties to their
immature frontal functioning. Another perspec-
tive is given by fuzzy-trace theory, an approach
that also assumes the involvement of another
false-memory editing operation. Brainerd et al.
(2003) argued that, although it is available to
young children, recollection rejection becomes
more efficient with age, and that age-related
improvements in the retention of verbatim mem-
ories, together with an increase in the effective-
ness of retrieval cues, are the factors responsible
for the development of this operation.
However, age differences in editing processes
are not a sufficient explanation for all the results.
Another factor needs to be found to explain why
older children show substantial levels of false
memories for critical-basic items and very low
levels of false memories for critical-superordinate
items. It was thought that the distinctiveness
given by the understanding of conceptual organi-
sation could provide the central explanation for
these results. It is known from earlier studies on
conceptual development that preadolescents are
already able to discriminate basic from super-
ordinate items (Bjorklund, 2005). The results of
the present study suggest that these children can
use this information to suppress false recognition
for words that belong to a different hierarchical
level from the studied words. In this case the
distinctiveness provided by the presentation of
exemplars, all from the same basic category,
facilitated the false memory suppression of other
names that, although they are related to the same
category, do not belong to the same hierarchical
level. In contrast, younger children are not able to
do this. Younger children do not distinguish
different levels of the hierarchy or at least do
not use this knowledge to achieve a more
accurate memory performance. Because for these
children superordinate names are not made dis-
tinctive by conceptual knowledge, they could not
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use a distinctiveness-based heuristic to suppress
them.
Although basic names are acquired first in
children’s language, are more frequent in adult
discourse and are used earlier and are more
accessible in naming behaviour than superordi-
nate names (Horton & Markman, 1980; Mervis &
Crisafi, 1982; Skwarchuk & Anglin, 1997),
younger children recognised unpresented super-
ordinate names at the same rate as unpresented
basic names. This could mean that, although
younger children do not use the hierarchical
knowledge in memory tasks, they are able to
form mental representations of the categories
(including their names) or extract the gist of the
lists when basic exemplars are presented. This
interpretation is consistent with the Bjorklund
(1980) study in which kindergarten children
increased performance in a category identifica-
tion task (prior to recall) when the exemplars
were presented in blocks rather than in random
order. It seems that, under appropriate presenta-
tion conditions, younger children can extract
category relations and therefore can activate the
name of the categories.
The observation that children can extract
category relations and activate the name of the
categories does not mean that they could use this
information in an editing process. Therefore, it is
reasonable to argue that superordinate names are
activated at the same rate as the dominant
exemplar, but because younger children are
limited in editing processes and cannot be helped
by the use of hierarchical knowledge, they are not
able to suppress false memories for superordinate
names. Although this seems to be a coherent
explanation, one cannot exclude the possibility
that young children do not edit critical-super-
ordinates because they are particularly inefficient
in implementing distinctiveness heuristics of all
types (Howe, 2006b). Perhaps young children are
not able to abstract a general rule as a strategy for
rejecting false memories. Actually, it is known
that young children’s performances decrease
when the tasks rely on memory strategies and
that only at the end of elementary school years
can they conduct appropriate memory searches
during retrieval (Bjorklund & Coyle, 1995;
Schneider & Bjorklund, 1998). Specifically re-
garding false memories, recent studies (Ghetti,
2003; Ghetti & Alexander, 2004; Ghetti & Casteli,
2006) have shown that young children are not
able to apply rules based on expected memor-
ability to infer event non-occurrence, even when
they are instructed to use them. Thus, the results
of the present study do not rule out the alter-
native argument that young children are able to
distinguish different hierarchical levels but are
still inefficient in using a decision-based process
such as a distinctiveness heuristic.
A similar opposite effect was also observed
when the standard DRM procedure with associa-
tive lists was used. Because associative lists give
rise to a decrease in the distinctiveness of super-
ordinate names, we predicted that the editing
process for those lists would be lower than for the
categorised lists, resulting in greater false recog-
nition for critical-superordinates of the associa-
tive DRM. But we did not find a significant
difference in false memories for superordinate
names between those two types of lists. For older
children this could mean that they are able to
discriminate basic from superordinate categories
even when distinctiveness decreases; for younger
children, this result indicates that they are prob-
ably not influenced by such distinctiveness
manipulation because they do not have the
conceptual knowledge that allows for the emer-
gence of distinctiveness. Even when using asso-
ciative lists, younger children showed higher
levels of false recognition for superordinate
names than older children. It seems that, for
these children, the confusion between the domi-
nant exemplar and the superordinate name of the
same category still occurs in associative lists.
The result that younger children falsely recog-
nise more superordinate names than older chil-
dren even for associative lists (as well as the
similar level of related intrusions obtained in
Experiment 1 for both age groups) seems to
contradict the assumption that older children
are more prone to false memories of all types of
semantic gist-related items. In fact, studies that
analyse critical and related intrusions together
showed an increase of semantic gist-related
intrusions with development (Dewhurst &
Robinson, 2004). However, when the analyses
exclude the critical items and separate the related
from the unrelated intrusions, the same pattern is
not always obtained. In the Carneiro et al. (2007)
study, preschool children recalled significantly
more related and unrelated intrusions than pre-
adolescents (although this is not evident in the
study of Brainerd et al., 2002). Furthermore,
when the related intrusions were divided by the
number of words recalled, preschool children
produced more relative false recall compared to
adults (Carneiro et al., 2007). This seems to
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reinforce the idea that false memories in older
children and adults are much more centred on the
critical words (the converging associative word or
the dominant exemplar), whereas in younger
children they are more dispersed, including all
the other related items that the editing processes
were not successful in suppressing. Thus, this
explanation attributes a special role to the editing
processes in the production of false memories in
children using the DRM paradigm. While the age
trends of false memories for associative conver-
ging words or dominant exemplars could be
explained only by processes that occur at encod-
ing, without any contribution from the editing
processes, the same does not happen when super-
ordinate names are tested. In this case, it is
fundamental to refer to inference or decision
processes that occur mainly at retrieval. Thus,
it seems that both fuzzy-trace and activation-
monitoring theories could explain the observed
results, since they include an editing process in
their frameworks, and they both complement it
with distinctiveness-based mechanisms provided
by knowledge of the categorical hierarchy.
Actually, relying exclusively on the concept of
gist, it would be difficult to explain such results.
As was pointed out earlier (Chiang & Chiu,
2006), fuzzy-trace theory is unspecific about
which item*dominant basic or category label*
is the best representation of a categorised list.
Gist-based explanations are problematic, espe-
cially if one accepts that the category name,
corresponding to the theme of the list, is con-
sidered to be the gist representation. In this case,
it would be expected that the category names
would produce more false recognition than domi-
nant exemplars, at least for older children. More-
over, because younger children are assumed to be
limited in their gist-processing abilities, it would
also be expected that older children would
recognise more category names than younger
children. But contrasting results to these ones
were found in the present study.
This study emphasised that not all gist-related
items behave in the same way. The developmental
direction of false memories for standard critical
words (converging associates or dominant exem-
plars) could be rather distinct from the develop-
mental direction of other gist-related words, such
as superordinate names. The findings of the
present study suggest that those names could be
exceptions, due to the interference of the degree
of understanding of hierarchical structures. In
fact, although we found a decrease in false
memories for category names as age progresses,
we did not find significant age differences for the
recall of other gist-related words (i.e., related
intrusions) with categorised lists. In order to have
a definite answer in relation to the developmental
trend of false memories for gist-related words, it
would be important to know what happens when
other types of semantic gist-related words are
tested and to compare these with category names
and with other words that are considered not to
be gist related.
In the present study we used materials based
on age-appropriate norms because in this way we
can make sure that the exemplars are familiar to
children and guarantee the use of dominant
exemplars for each age group. This methodology
seems to be more appropriate for the study of
false memories in children, since earlier experi-
ments showed higher levels of false recall in the
case of materials designed specifically for the
children’s age (Carneiro et al., 2007). However,
we are aware that this methodology gives rise to
differences in the stimuli used. Similarly, in order
to adjust the distractor task to the abilities of
young children, these children were instructed to
count forwards rather than backwards, as was the
case with preadolescents. Although justified, and
probably more appropriate, the lack of an equal
methodology (for both materials and distractor
task) between the different age groups could be
considered a limitation of the present study.
In summary, the developmental trend of false
memories obtained with the DRM paradigm has
been explained by processes that could mainly
operate at encoding by both thematic consis-
tency and associative-based activation. These
approaches could also explain the same develop-
mental direction for false memories at the basic
categorical level. However, in order to account
for the false recognition results at the super-
ordinate level, it is crucial to take into account
age differences in inferential or decision pro-
cesses that occur mainly at retrieval. Using
categorised lists and a similar DRM procedure,
this study emphasised the contribution of the
distinctiveness information provided by concep-
tual knowledge in explaining age differences for
false memories of gist-related words.
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APPENDIX
Preschoolers’ lists
Categorical lists
Animal. Lion. Elephant, giraffe, tiger, crocodile,
hippopotamus, snake, zebra, dog, horse, monkey
Body. Belly. Hands, legs, feet, arms, mouth, nose,
eyes, head, fingers, hair
Clothing. Trousers. Sweater, shoes, coat, smock,
socks, skirt, shirt, tights, panties, boots
Fruit. Apple. Pear, orange, banana, peach, pine-
apple, grapes, lemon, tangerine, strawberry,
melon
Furniture. Table. Chair, bed, television, sofa,
cupboard, lamp, clock, stool, telephone, desk
Vehicle. Car. Coach, aeroplane, train, bus,
motorbike, lorry, tram, boat, taxi, bicycle
Associative lists
Animal. Lion. King, eats, scare, Simba, tiger,
strong, jungle, mane, zoo, to roar
Body. Belly. Belly-button, heart, food, babies,
breasts, pain, fat, stomach, full, hungry
Clothing. Trousers. Wear, sweater, legs, wash,
shorts, shoes, to button, torn, jeans, pockets
Fruit. Apple. To eat, to peel, banana, stone, pear,
wash, red, peel, to chew, bite
Furniture. Table. Food, draw, games, chair, table-
cloth, plates, to tidy up, clean, stool, seat
Vehicles. Car. Wheels, drive, steering-wheel,
windows, doors, dad, glass, light, seats, street
Preadolescents’ lists
Categorical lists
Animal. Dog. Cat, lion, giraffe, elephant, bird,
dolphin, horse, monkey, cow, fish
Body. Legs. Head, arms, feet, hands, eyes, fingers,
mouth, belly, ears, nose
Clothing. Trousers. Sweater, shirt, socks, t-shirt,
skirt, panties, coat, shorts, sneakers, scarf
Fruit. Orange. Apple, banana, pear, pineapple,
strawberry, mango, peach, kiwi, grapes, lemon
Furniture. Table. Cupboard, bed, chair, sofa,
television, chest of drawers, desk, lamp, bookcase,
stool
Vehicle. Car. Bus, aeroplane, train, underground,
motorbike, tram, bicycle, boat, taxi, coach
Associative lists
Animal. Dog. Bitch, cat, bark, leash, collar,
friend, bite, kennel, hair, doghouse
Body. Legs. To walk, to run, hair, to jump, skin,
feet, long, bones, muscles, broken
Clothing. Trousers. Jeans, pockets, to dress, shorts,
cords, stretched, blue, torn, zipper, tights
Fruit. Orange. Colour, juice, to eat, round, orange
tree, vitamin, segment (of orange), tangerine,
citrus fruit, peel
Furniture. Table. Food, wood, tablecloth, cover,
chairs, dinner, lunch, meals, dish, work
Vehicle. Car. Wheels, engine, steering-wheel, van,
door, ride, accident, drive, street, Ferrari
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